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In a federation the common justification for a second chamber is that the interests of
members of the federation should be protected from the federal level of government.
This argument does not apply in the UK. However there are other considerations
that justify a second chamber in the UK, in particular the need for ‘sober second
thoughts’ and consideration of constitutional and other wider issues that arise in the
legislative process.
The UK does not have a codified entrenched constitution and thus – unlike many
liberal democracies – the UK does not have a supreme court with power to
strike down or declare unconstitutional laws that are contrary to the constitution,
human rights and so on. Instead the system relies heavily on intra-parliamentary
mechanisms for upholding constitutional principles and human rights. In this respect
it is not unique: the UK resembles Finland. Until recently there was no judicial
constitutional review in Finland. Instead the highly respected, expert Committee for
Constitutional Law in the unicameral parliament scrutinises bills for constitutionality.
Such intra-parliamentary mechanisms do not, and cannot, operate in the UK House
of Commons because it is highly partisan and party political. The Commons are for
the most part not interested in the technicalities of the legislative process but in the
rough and tumble of party politics and nursing their constituencies – a side effect of
the single member constituency system.
Intra-parliamentary scrutiny does however operate very effectively in the UK, in
the less partisan, expert House of Lords. This is because of the differences in
composition of the two chambers: the second chamber does not normally have
a majority from the government party or parties, so it is never a ‘rubber stamp’.
Nor does the opposition have a majority in the Lords. And the House is prevented
from obstructing the government too much by the fact that its members realise
that the Commons has electoral legitimacy while theirs do not; they only have a
delaying power of one year over most bills. This recognition is implicit in some of the
conventions in favour of the Government having its business dealt with promptly in
the Lords, and to an extent the Salisbury Convention according to which the Lords
will not oppose at second reading bills that were promised in the election manifesto
of the government party. (This does not work in a coalition.)
Composition and Legitimacy of the House of Lords
The composition of the UK House of Lords differs in every possible way from that
of the House of Commons. All of the members of the latter are elected on the first
past the post/plurality system. The government is usually formed by whoever can
command a majority in the House of Commons. By contrast none of the members
of the House of Lords is elected. Some 92 are hereditary peers. 26 are bishops and
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archbishops of the Church of England (the established church in England, but not
in Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland). And the rest of the members – some 650
in all – are life peers, appointed by the Queen on the advice of the Prime Minister
of the day. Recent Prime Ministers have accepted that new appointments should
promote proportionality as between the parties in the House according to votes
cast in the most recent election. Some 20% of members of the House of Lords
are independents (cross benchers). The Lords are paid a per diem allowance for
attendance. Many of them hardly ever attend.
The active membership – some 450 – includes many elder statesmen, retired
judges, people who have had their careers in the voluntary or public sector,
members of most professions, philosophers, etc. The chamber is more diverse
than the Commons, having a higher proportion of active female members, disabled
people, members of ethnic minorities and adherents to minority religions.
While the current unelected composition of the Lords is controversial and difficult to
justify rationally, it is widely agreed across the political spectrum that the Chamber
discharges its functions in legislative scrutiny and examination of public polices well.
It is agreed that, if reformed by introducing elections, the second chamber ought
not to be based on the same system as the Commons – first past the post. A form
of proportional representation should be used. It is also agreed that the Commons
should enjoy primacy over the Lords: this means that the Lords should not have the
power to frustrate the government except by delaying the passing of legislation by
about a year. This power generally allows for the government of the day and the
Commons to have ‘sober second thoughts’. It is also agreed that the Lords should
not have a majority for a party in opposition. And the Lords should not have electoral
legitimacy that challenges the Commons.
Two questions then arise: How then can the Lords claim, or be granted, legitimacy in
a representative democracy like the UK? And how, if at all, can it be reformed?
First, it should be noted that unelected, non-political bodies play important roles in
the legislative processes in many democracies: obvious examples are the French
Conseil d’Etat and similar bodies in other countries, including Italy. The French
Conseil Constitutionnel also has important roles in protecting the Constitution before
a projet de loi is promulgated by the President. Such bodies derive their legitimacy
from the constitutional or legislative mandate that they have, and from the very fact
that they are politically independent and expert. These are examples of possible
sources of legitimacy apart from election. The House of Lords can claim relative
independence and non-partisan approach when scrutinising bills and draft bills,
and members with expertise and experience which they bring to bear to those
activities. Legitimacy can derive from the quality of a body’s work. Expert, impartial
scrutiny of bills and draft bills and government policies, particularly in relation to
constitutional issues (the work of the Constitution Committee of the House of Lords),
the delegation of legislative powers (the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform
Committee) and human rights (the Joint Committee on Human Rights) are important
parts of the legislative process in any democracy and should be performed in non-
partisan ways by those with expertise and experience.
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Furthermore the Lords’ power is limited to amending bills, and to delay their passing
into law by a year: they do not exercise veto powers. The lack of election is therefore
less of an objection to this Chamber than it would be to unelected chambers with
veto powers.
In practice the House of Lords does not compromise rule by the government and the
majority which it commands in the House of Commons. The second chamber in the
UK can delay legislation for about a year only.
Reform of the House of Lords?
Successful reform of the House of Lords can only succeed if the government, the
parties and the Commons appreciate the importance of the work the Lords do and
their own inevitable shortcomings in these respects: currently they do not.
The main issue in the UK is whether the second chamber should be wholly or partly
elected. Attempts have been made in recent years to introduce election to the
membership: all have failed. The problem is here that election could challenge the
primacy of the Commons, on which the smooth operation of the political system
depends. And elected members are unlikely to have the skills, expertise and above
all relatively non-partisan attitudes which are required for the second chamber to
continue to do its valuable work of expert scrutiny of bills and debate of public policy.
If the UK had a Conseil d’Etat, or a codified entrenched constitution instituting a
supreme court with power to strike down unconstitutional laws, things would be
different. But it does not, and is unlikely to in the foreseeable future.
Meanwhile incremental reform have taken place recently, and will continue. The
House of Lords Reform Act 1999 removed all but 92 hereditary peers. This dealt with
problems of over-representation of Conservatives in the House, and its size – still by
far the largest second chamber among democracies (though many members do not
attend, and many are only part time.) The House of Lords Reform Act 2014 enabled
peers to retire, removed those who do not fulfil minimum attendance requirements
and those convicted of serious criminal offences (of whom there have been very
few). This is unlikely to result in the House becoming much smaller.
Further reforms would be positive, such as transferring the nomination of new peers
from the Prime Minister to a statutory appointments commission that would work to
explicit criteria, including decreasing the size of the chamber, and achieving party
balance, independence, diversity and expertise.
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